ZHUL-QI’DA 17, 1429 A.H.
THURSDAY NOVEMBER 13 2008
Print This Page 
Strategies and tasks for constitution making
By Abiodun Aremu
Defining The Strategy
Constitution-making is more of political and legitimate questions than the legalistic and bogus 'rule of law. Even the ruling elites never make pretence about this. For instance, the Electoral Reform Panel (ERP), - a hurried contraption by Yar'Adua - was a political and legitimacy begging carrot to curry public sympathy and blackmail the Judiciary for a biased and so-called political judgment in favour of the regime. Two instances suffice here of the futility of the ERP.
First, the incident of June 25, 2008 by the UAD in the gallery against the leadership of the panel for its double standards and selective intimidation of critical voices and patronage of pro-ruling PDP views. The second is the news making the grapevine of the ERP's secret visitations to the IBBs and OBJs' as 'stakeholders' in the reform process.
Therefore, in fashioning out appropriate strategy, every issue must be discussed. A 48 years' old country that has repeatedly failed exams in the quest for nationhood must first admit its failure to appreciate the imperative necessity for reform or change. At this stage, it is important to recall my submission five years ago on the critique of the CSOs - Civil Society Organisations' - weak approach to negotiation.
We are always in a rush to be trapped. For instance, I argued in November 2006 at the 2nd NSF that: "Are we really negotiating or winning? We have failed in that direction so far because negotiation implies some compromises and when in 1998/99 we negotiated from the position of weakness, we are now the losers. From the benefit of hindsight, if our non-participation in the General Abdulsalam Abubakar transition to civilian rule had been anchored on insisting in the making of a process-led constitution before the 1998/99 elections, probably by now, we would have made some advances in the direction of democracy. The lesson is that in a new transition arrangement in future, we must have fundamental issues on which to negotiate. It must be clear that the conditionality on which a process is negotiated ultimately determine the context of governance and the problems it would concern itself with."
At least, the registration of AD that could not meet the INEC requirements suffices here because the regime had to appease the party floated by the NADECO chieftains.
I also queried at that forum: "Why has it been impossible for the opposition parties to insist on an agenda of a democratic constitution, which I believe is a germane document to found democratic governance, if that is even our desire?
And I'm still sustained by the conclusion then: "I have faint hope that democracy may be possible in Nigeria and Iam not sure the present civilian arrangement provides any basis on which to build or consolidate any constitutional rule. I disagree with those who think we are just beginning as a nation, and providing flimsy excuses for our somersaulting after 46 years of independence. How we measure success or failure is also important. Failure or success is a gradual process. Africa's experiences under slave trade and colonialism took about 450 years. Fifty years of neo-colonial independence in the life of a people is not a joke. Thus, the agenda of neo-liberal economy, phony anti-graft war and pseudo strengthening of the institutions of democracy are the interventions that were concluded by the Nigeria political clique and the foreign influences in negotiating the current transition."
The LCM Approach is Critical
This is the lowest common multiple (LCM), that affords all those on the alternative side to arrive at a minimum acceptable negotiating list. It should first and foremost absolve itself from the mindset of amendments on the terms dictated by the status quo.
Before adopting the LCM approach, the objectives of the constitution-making must be clearly defined by resolving the following questions:
- Is the objective the mere legalistic removal of Section 9 and piecemeal amendments?
- What are the values of the constitution vis-a-vis the legal fraud called non-justiceable provisions?
- Will the reform guarantee improved access to enjoyment of basic rights, popular participation, and respect of the aspirations of the governed?
The approach entails that:
- Each group needs to independently review the documents by others, and come to terms with how much concession it is willing to afford in the harmonization.
- Committee meetings' to harmonise areas of common agreements.
- There should be report back for adoption of the common agreements.
- All the groups should speak as a voice to the common agreements.
The Tasks
i. Need medium and long-term strategies.
ii. Intensive advocacy and comprehensive strategies at all stages.
iii. Influencing public opinions, national assembly, public hearings and media.
iv. Documents and information on it be widely circulated through all forms - email, adverts, regular media briefing, handbills (executive summary).
v. Capacity of the groups in favour of constitutional reform, viz. legislative, advocacy, and institutional.
vi. The Ethnic Factor in mobilisation - the Jakande-Jafojo and Ige-Afolabi tickets broke ethnic, rotational and religious divisiveness and barriers, and were founded on sound collective and social endeavour of their party's manifesto on social welfare programmes. Hence, the attractive appeal of ethnicity as a mobilising framework for people of the same ancestral origin should be seen as a complement of the socio-economic variables, and not the other way around.
vii. Alternative agenda rest in heavy investment on the rebuilding of the social movement to recover its traditions of independence, vibrancy, and self-motivation; and to avoid the charade of paying 'rent-a-crowd.' All cultural ingredients (music, drama, town meetings, social clubs, harvest festivals, etc) should be mobilised in such ways that farmers, students, professionals, etc, can in their own specific realities internalize their desires in the constitution.
viii. Building the 'disciples theory' from among and to work among the women, fishermen, farmers, traders, militants, social forces, etc.
ix. Need to train organisers and mobilisers in the art of popular mobilization.
x. The leadership question need be resolved not as in ethnic leader, but in favour of a broad minded, and non-sectarian. This is because as identified above that, there exist sub and micro ethnic consciousness and already corroborated by the factionalisation in the various ethnic groups, which can be exploited divisively and appealed to by the ruling cabals to break the fragile ethnic solidarity. For instance, the Yoruba agenda is not only isolationist but egocentric, and imperialistic and can never really (beyond the media show) mobilise the ordinary Yoruba in Kwara and Kogi states.
xi. Must have strategy to contain the rapacious plots by the local and international ruling cabals to split the unified movement. What is required is a strategy driven by a consistent ideological campaign among the people and against the status quo. We need a social movement that should link the economic desires of the people to politics. Past regimes, doctored by the ruling dynasty, have consciously through stick and carrot approaches weakened and destroyed the social movement.culled Gamji.com.
